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Abstract 
In this paper we treat workplace voice and systems of high-commitment human resource 
management (HCHRM) as technological innovations in order to account for the uneven 
diffusion patterns observed across establishments. Using British data, the paper finds that 
variables highlighted in the technological diffusion literature are significant predictors of voice 
and HRM adoption decisions. Workplace size, size of multi-establishment network, ownership 
type, set-up date and network affects all play a significant role in high-commitment HRM 
adoption. We also find that union presence, per se, is not an inhibitor to the adoption of high 
commitment HRM practices.  
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1. Introduction 
From administering payroll to the provision of meaningful two-way forms of workplace 
communication, the management of human resources occurs across a number of dimensions. 
When employers treat these latter dimensions seriously, they can be said to employ a formal 
voice regime at their workplace  Voice regimes can be direct or representative in nature and can 
be delivered in a number of ways; via a union, through management led initiatives or as part of 
some dual channel where management voice and union collective representation are both present 
(Willman et al., 2004). Voice can also be accompanied by a system of high commitment human 
resource management (HCHRM) practices. The specific practices that form part of any given 
HCHRM system can be quite diverse, but typically they involve managerial attempts to motivate 
and manage workers through a series of workplace practices rather than through strict command 
and control structures. These various choices (e.g., the choice between adopting certain HCHRM 
practices or not, between offering voice or not, and between the in-house employer provision of 
voice or some union provision of voice) can be thought of as “technological” or “process 
innovation” adoption decisions. In this paper we model the correlates of these adoption decisions 
for British workplaces. 
The impetus for this paper stems from a basic problem noted by a number of previous 
researchers (Erikson and Jacoby 2003; Baker, 1999) - voice and HCHRM have been found to 
impart measurable benefits to adopting firms, yet ubiquitous adoption has not occurred 
(Ichniowski et al., 1996; Godard 2004). Up to now, most explanations for uneven diffusion 
patterns have relied on fairly ad hoc model specifications and apart from some recent exceptions 
(Eriksson, 2002), most of the literature has focused almost exclusively on the US.  
In this paper we treat voice and HCHRM as technological innovations and explain why 
this approach can help explain the adoption patterns of British establishments over time. 
Specifically, we use Workplace Employment Relations Survey (WERS) data from 1984 to 1998 
to answer a series of longstanding questions in the HCHRM literature. We begin by asking 
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whether the presence of voice is a significant predictor of HCHRM intensity. The existence of a 
positive correlation between the two usage decisions would be an indicator of “supermodularity” 
(Milgrom and Roberts, 1995). As a corollary we also ask which voice-type (i.e., union, dual or 
non-union) is most strongly linked to HCHRM intensity. This is an important question as it has 
been argued that HCHRM and union voice act as substitutes at the workplace. We then ask what 
workplace characteristics are likely to increase the net benefit of adopting voice and HCHRM and 
test whether these associations are empirically significant. Finally, we ask why it is that sector 
(state sector  vs.  private sector) and ownership type (family owned vs. publicly owned) remain 
such significant predictors of voice and HCHRM intensity across workplaces, even after 
controlling for typical explanations such as workplace size and industry. 
 We begin by looking at the formal literature on technological diffusion and develop 
hypotheses regarding the effect of several key variables on the adoption of voice and high-
commitment human resource innovations at the workplace. Next we look at the data and describe 
the pattern of voice and HCHRM adoption in Britain. Then we test the hypotheses developed 
earlier using establishment data on variables linked to several diffusion models. We do this so as 
to distinguish which model is at work. We end with a discussion of the implications of our work 
for both theory and practice. 
 
2.Theoretical Background 
Implementing high-commitment human resource practices such as self-directed work teams or the 
adoption of a grievance procedure for employees seems straightforward: if the HRM practice or 
voice regime provides a net benefit (i.e. the discounted sum of future benefits less the cost of 
implementing the practice) it should be adopted by the workplace. In particular, it would seem 
that a practice (or set of practices) that conveys net benefits such as increased motivation, lower 
turnover, and greater information sharing should be adopted ubiquitously across all 
establishments. As can be seen from Figures 1 and 2, however, the distribution of voice (i.e., the 
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presence of some formal two-way form of communication) and high-commitment HRM practices 
across British establishments is not uniform. The HR practices that we consider high-commitment 
are 13 in total and are derived from studies by Pfeffer (1995) and Storey (1992). The specific 
measures are discussed in detail in section 3 of the paper, but what is of importance in this context 
is that looking at the empirical distribution of HRM practices (figure 1) in 1998, we find that 27.7 
percent of establishments with more than 10 employees had implemented fewer than 4 HRM 
practices, while an almost equal proportion had employed more than 10.  Clearly, ubiquitous 
adoption has not occurred and there is substantial variation in HCHRM intensity that requires 
explaining.  
In the case of voice, adoption varies considerably by firm characteristics such as set-up 
date and sector (figure 2). This seems to suggest that there are more differentiated considerations 
at play than the simple cost-benefit model would suggest. In particular, we have to ask what it is 
that keeps workplaces from implementing better (more profitable) HRM and voice-related 
practices?1 A look at the concepts of adoption and diffusion of new technologies may be helpful 
here.  
2.1 High-Commitment HRM and Voice as a Problem of Technology Adoption 
In what way, then, is implementing voice or an HR practice equivalent to a technology adoption 
decision? First, individual workplaces are not born with a voice regime or HCHRM system in 
place, meaning that there is an explicit adoption decision to consider. The timing of adoption is 
governed by the profitability and the arbitrage conditions.2 Adoption also resembles “switching” 
                                                 
1 Hannan et al. (2004) study organizational inertia using a simulation model. While inertia in their study can 
be interpreted in many ways, the notion that firms are exposed to risks when undergoing an organizational 
transformation resonates with our intuition of workplaces implementing differences HRM practices. 
Uncertainty being the cause of adoption delays is one of the lines of reasoning we will test in this paper. 
2 The profitability condition states that adoption must be convey positive benefits at the time of adoption, 
and the arbitrage condition postulates that waiting (arbitrage over time) is not profitable (Stoneman, 2002). 
 3
– e.g. from a no-voice default to some form of voice – which calls for an assessment of switching 
costs, sunk costs and replacement effects.  
For any technology or process innovation, there may also exist significant set-up costs 
even in the absence of purchasing costs. In our case these could include hiring HR expertise with 
specific knowledge of industry and firm characteristics. These costs may differ across workplaces 
and decrease over time, as the supply of this HR expertise increases.  
Thus, it seems straightforward to view high-commitment HRM practices and voice as 
technologies, save for the absence of a “seller” and a “buyer” of voice or HRM technology. After 
all, firms do not “purchase” HRM practices or voice regimes necessarily, they merely choose to 
adopt them. Taking this argument further, however, would suggest that in the absence of this cost 
and the existence of positive benefits, all firms should have adopted voice and high-commitment 
HR practices by now. As this is clearly not the case, our analogy holds as there still seem to be 
significant non-pecuniary cost (e.g. learning cost) that deter firms from adopting voice or 
progressive HR practices ubiquitously. What is important for the voice and HCHRM as 
technology approach is that (1) net benefits differ across establishments for a host of reasons, (2) 
that they vary over time, and (3) that they may be negative for some firms at some points in time. 
This framework works well where establishments have discretion in whether to adopt voice and 
HR practices or not. Indeed, one can think of situations where because of federal statue or EU 
law, the workplace is obligated to provide a formal voice regime to its employees. In such cases, 
the state has effectively “set a technology standard” for all workplaces, perhaps cognizant of the 
uneven diffusion patterns that are present in the absence of outside policy intervention.3 
The intuition above sets up our use of more formal models that can generate 
technological diffusion, i.e., the uneven and staggered adoption of an otherwise profitable 
                                                 
3 Cabral and Kretschmer (forthcoming) propose a formal model of a standard-setting policymaker which 
takes the costs of non-standardization into account and derives policy implications as a function of the 
relative importance of these costs. Koski and Kretschmer (2004) give an overview over recent empirical 
work in standardization. 
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technology. Nelson et al. (2004) classify different diffusion processes according to the degree of 
dynamic increasing returns (e.g. through network effects, competitive advantage or economies of 
learning and scale) and the ability to gather “sharp”, i.e. objectively verifiable information on the 
technology (e.g. through information transmission and learning). Along similar lines, Geroski 
(2000) distinguishes between several effects that could generate technology diffusion. In 
particular, he identifies (1) the epidemic, (2) heterogeneity, (3) population ecology and (4) 
network effect approaches as possible generators of a staggered diffusion curve. We present each 
of these models below and extend the logic to cover questions of uneven HRM and voice 
adoption. 
 2.2 The Epidemic Approach to Voice and HRM Adoption 
The epidemic approach (or variants of it) states that the net benefit of a technology is not known 
ex ante and that adopters learn over time. In the basic model, they learn about the technology’s 
existence, while in information-cascade-type models, knowledge (or signals) of the technology’s 
quality are revealed by the adoption decisions of other users (Bikhchandani et al. ,1989). In both 
cases, knowledge can emerge exogenously (independent of adoption decisions) or endogenously 
(adoption-dependent). In the context of HRM and voice adoption, one could imagine that the age 
of the establishment, having access to information through employer affiliations or being part of a 
larger multi-unit firm network, would all be factors conducive to the increased (faster) adoption 
of HRM and voice-type offerings at the workplace level. Although relying on a different 
modelling approach, these latter two possibilities have already have been found to increase the 
likelihood of adoption of HRM intensive practices in the U.S. (Eriksson and Jacoby, 2003). 
 
2.3 The Heterogeneity Approach to Voice and HRM Adoption 
The heterogeneity approach ranks firms by their propensity to adopt a new technology and 
postulates that firms deriving higher utility from adopting the technology will do so first (i.e., 
rank effect). The preference ranking can originate from a whole host of factors, including benefits 
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(real or perceived) or costs (pecuniary and non-pecuniary) of adoption arising from absorptive 
capacity, switching cost, and usage of other complementary or substitute technologies. Under 
certain distributional assumptions,4 this approach will also generate an s-shaped diffusion pattern.  
In our case it seems intuitive that the benefits of high-commitment HRM and voice would be 
greater the larger the establishment. Establishment size increases employee alienation and 
supervisory costs. Workplaces faced with these problems are more likely to offer a grievance 
procedure and some form of self-monitoring, both of which can be engendered by voice and 
progressive HR practices. Conversely, the benefits of remaining voice free and still gaining 
valuable information from employees are greater the smaller the establishment.  
In terms of perceived benefits, the heterogeneity approach leads us to another set of 
predictions regarding risk and variables such as size and ownership. Agent decision making often 
displays puzzling departures from standard expected utility theory. In particular, it has been 
observed that agents become more risk taking as the potential prospects (returns) they face get 
larger (Astebro, 2004 and Starmer, 2000). In the context of HR and voice adoption, a firm would 
always be better off if it could appropriate all the benefits of voice without having to adopt a 
regime in the first place. This, however, is a risky decision and the tendency for that risky 
decision to occur, should increase as the prospects (returns) get better. In small owner-operated 
workplaces or in private (as opposed to public) sector workplaces, the potential returns of 
adopting voice for on owner-manager as the residual claimant are clearly greater than if a firm is 
run by management or is under state ownership (Astebro, 2004). One would expect that 
workplaces with less to gain (or more to lose) from non-adoption will be more likely to adopt 
voice or intense HRM, while owner-operated establishments with more to gain are more likely to 
remain HRM and voice-free.  
                                                 
4 Effectively, any distribution with a single peak in between the extreme values (e.g. a normal distribution) 
is sufficient. 
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The heterogeneity approach also notes the important role played by the costs of adoption. 
Adoption costs are especially relevant to small firms, as employing a sophisticated voice regime 
is not “cheap”. To the extent that some scale economies may be at work, this would work in 
favour of size being positively related to voice and HRM adoption. Costs may also arise after 
adoption, in the form of switching costs. Technologies often create lock-in affects (i.e., the more 
accustomed a workplace becomes to a certain way of doing things, the more costly it becomes to 
switch-out). Switching costs may be larger for certain voice regimes and HCHRM practices, 
which could explain the slower diffusion profiles for these technologies, as the existence of lock-
in induces delay on the part of potential adopters.  
In the case of HRM and voice, switching costs are have been affected by legal shifts and 
policy changes, since the early 1980s made union-free voice a more viable option for new 
establishments. Furthermore, because union voice necessarily involves a third party, it entails 
larger switching costs and hence one would expect that the incidence of union voice to be linked 
to set-up date – as establishments set up following these policy changes would face higher cost of 
switching out of union voice
. 
Finally, the heterogeneity approach recognizes that the presence of substitute or 
complementary technologies could affect the adoption decision. In this case, since there are two 
technologies (HCHRM and voice)  one can assess the well known contention (mostly found in the 
American literature) that a number of progressive HRM practices are substitutes for union voice, 
or equally, that union voice prevents firms from adopting the full panoply of progressive HRM 
policies.  
2.4 The Population Ecology Approach to Voice and HRM Adoption 
The population ecology approach relies on two factors to explain the gradual diffusion of 
technologies: a new technology of uncertain benefit may confer a competitive advantage to 
adopters. Early adopters will test the waters and if they are observed to improve their 
performance, will be imitated by later adopters. This imitation behaviour is termed the 
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legitimisation effect – whatever is used by others is likely to be profitable. On the other hand, the 
advantage that the new technology confers will decrease as the number of adopters increases– a 
technology used by everybody cannot be a source of competitive advantage. This will slow down 
adoption by non-adopters – this is called the competition effect. These two counteracting forces 
may be reflected in several variables in our dataset, such as the extent of industry-wide adoption, 
set-up date and age of establishment. Because the legitimisation and competition effects work in 
opposite directions, these variables may well display effects that are non-linear. 
2.5 The Network-Effect Approach to Voice and HRM Adoption 
Finally, network effects may contribute to the uneven diffusion of a technology. Early adopters 
(which may have a higher propensity to adopt) will not benefit much from other adopters, while 
for later adopters network benefits are more important. The inclusion of lagged industry adoption 
levels of voice (the only variable for which we have longitudinal data) if positive, would suggest 
that voice is a network good. The actual mechanism could be as follows: to the extent that a voice 
regime shared by up-stream and down-stream establishments within an industry makes employee 
hiring and training easier and less costly, it makes sense that there could be spillovers by industry 
(e.g. through staff fluctuation) or through the dispersion of economy-wide information (e.g. 
through the training of HR consultants who then work in several different jobs within an 
industry).  
2.6 Hypotheses 
The hypotheses on the adoption probabilities (and speed) of voice and HCHRM adoption that we 
can derive from the various diffusion models above can be summarized as follows: 
1. The size of inter- and intra-establishment networks positively affects the probability of 
voice and HCHRM adoption (epidemic model – learning and information spreading). 
2. Establishment size positively affects the probability of voice and HCHRM adoption 
(heterogeneity model - benefits). 
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3. Workplaces set up post 1980 will have a lower probability of voice and HCHRM 
adoption  than older firms (heterogeneity model – switching cost). 
4. Public ownership (vs. family ownership) and for-profit orientation (vs. government-
sector) positively affect the probability of adoption of voice and HCHRM (heterogeneity 
model – expected utility and residual claimancy). 
5. Aggregate industry adoption positively affects voice and HCHRM probabilities (network 
effects). 
6. Voice and HCHRM adoption are positively correlated (supermodularity). 
 
In the following section, we specify several tests of the explanations above for the staggered 
diffusion of voice and HCHRM technology.  
 
3. The Data 
We use the British Workplace Industrial Relations Surveys (WIRS), which consist of large scale 
repeated surveys of industrial relations in British establishments in the public and private sectors 
that have been conducted on four occasions – 1980, 1984, 1990 and 1998. The key features of 
this data set are described elsewhere (Millward et al., 2000, 3-10; 248-55, Michie and Sheehan, 
1999). Our analysis is based on data collected from Human Resource managers responsible for 
the workplace industrial relations in the 1984, 1990 and 1998 surveys, which contain the voice-
related variables needed for our analysis. All analyses are weighted by the inverse of the 
workplace’s probability of selection for the survey. With these weights, our analyses provide a 
representative portrait of workplaces in Britain with 25+ employees at the time of the surveys.  
The size threshold for inclusion in WIRS was dropped to 10 employees in 1998. When analyses 
are confined to this 1998 survey, we include all workplaces with 10 or more employees. 
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No-voice workplaces are defined by the absence of two-way forms of (representative or 
direct) communication between workers and management. Specifically, in our data, to be 
considered a no-voice establishment a workplace must lack the following: 
 union recognition 
 union representatives on or off site 
 a joint consultative committee meeting at least once a month 
 non-union representatives on site* 
 problem solving groups* 
 regular meetings between management and employees which allow for two-way 
communication 
 team briefings that occur at least once a month and devote time to employees’ 
questions/views. 
The starred items indicate measures available in the 1998 survey only. In the time-series analysis 
that follows we employ a narrow no-voice definition (lacking the additional 1998 measures) to 
make 1984-1998 comparisons. When analyses are confined to 1998, we consider the sensitivity of 
our results to the use of the broad definition which includes them. 
For our measure of high-commitment human resource management practices,5 we base 
our HRM intensity variable on managerial concepts outlined by Pfeffer (1995), in which he 
explains how to produce a sustainable competitive advantage through the effective management 
of people. The dimensions captured are: 
(1) selectivity in recruiting,  
(2) employment security,  
(3) incentive pay,  
(4) employee ownership,  
                                                 
5 For a detailed explanation of the survey and construction of our HRM intensity measure, see Bryson 
(2001). 
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(5) information sharing,  
(6) participation and empowerment,  
(7) self-managed teams,  
(8) training and skill development,  
(9) cross-utilisation and cross-training,  
(10) symbolic egalitarianism,  
(11) promotion from within.  
In addition, the score includes an indicator that the workplace has a (12) formal strategic plan, 
strategic planning being a key component on HRM according to some commentators (Storey, 
1992) and (13) widespread appraisal systems. A score of 13 would denote affirmative answers to 
each of these questions. Lacking any one of these HRM variables would give an establishment a 
score of 12 and so on.6  
 
4. The Empirical Approach 
Most studies of technology diffusion look at diffusion within a population, i.e. at aggregate 
figures (e.g. Koski and Kretschmer, forthcoming). With the availability of more detailed data, 
however, individual switching decisions can be analyzed (Astebro, 2004). Using workplace-level 
data, we pursue the second approach to explain the aggregate diffusion in the economy. 
We assume that every workplace weighs current benefits and costs and make the decision 
to adopt or delay adoption depending on the net benefit’s sign. We also include aggregate figures 
in the industry and economy to capture information and network effects. As we are analysing two 
“technologies” simultaneously (voice and HCHRM), we also test for the cross-effect between the 
                                                 
6 Clearly, this is the simplest way of defining HRM intensity. Assigning different weights to each of these 
elements or using clusters of HRM practices does not fundamentally alter our conclusions (results available 
upon request). 
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two to determine whether the technologies are supermodular (Milgrom and Roberts, 1995), i.e. if 
usage of one will affect the likelihood of adoption of the other technology.  
 Hypotheses 1 through 6 posited a positive relationship between voice and establishment 
characteristics such as public sector, workplace size, being part of a multi-establishment network, 
member of an employer association, and the extent of voice in an industry, controlling for other 
establishment-level variables such as industry (denoted Z ). A negative effect was hypothesised 
between voice and family ownership. More nuanced outcomes were hypothesised for the 
determinants of voice-type; establishments with recent set up dates would be positively associated 
with non-union forms of voice and negatively with union-only voice. We use the following 
estimation model to test our hypotheses.  
[1]             
.80
)1(Pr
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When we estimate this equation for voice and voice types (where 0 is no-voice in all cases), 
because we have three WERS data sets over three periods, we use a pooled times series estimate 
for [1]. This can account for cohort effects separately from pure age of establishment effects. 
However, the 1998 WERS contains a richer dataset which allows us to add variables such as age 
of establishment, family ownership vs. publicly owned (stock), size of the establishment network, 
and number of organisational affiliations (as well as type). We drop the time subscript t when we 
focus on the 1998 WERS only. In all cases our estimates are presented in the easier to interpret 
linear probability estimate form. As these estimates are not qualitatively different from our logit 
estimates, we provide those upon request. 
 With respect to HCHRM intensity we estimate a similar model to [1], but since the HRM 
questions were only asked in the 1998 WERS survey, we are confined to that survey year only. 
We do, however, augment the model with the richer variable list available in the 1998 WERS, 
which among other things allows us to estimate the  “cross-effect” between the two technologies, 
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i.e., the association between voice and HCHRM intensity, as well as the potential substitutability 
of union voice and HCHRM.  
..
 HRMscore      [2]
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When we estimate these equations for HRM intensity we also add a variant which codes a cut off 
of our score in order to designate “high” HRM intensity and the probability of an establishment 
falling above such a cut-off based on the variables highlighted above.   
 
5. Results 
We first present some basic descriptive data on voice, HRM intensity and the association between 
the two. As this is the only source of representative data for Britain on these variables, the 
descriptive results are interesting in their own right. Table 1 reports the incidence of voice for the 
pooled dataset and for the first (1984) and last (1998) wave of the WERS surveys. The overall 
rates are presented and also broken down by right-hand side variables. The percentage of 
establishments with some form of voice ranges for lows of 64.1 and 66.5 percent in single-
establishments and family owned operations respectively to a high of 98 percent in establishments 
with more than 1000 employees. The overall sample average for all establishments is 82.6 
percent. Looking across row 1, there is no evidence of a change in the incidence of voice across 
the entire economy. However, these figures conceal considerable variations in voice type over 
time and across key variables such as set-up date, sector and industry. 
In figures 3 and 4 we show adoption of voice in Britain by set-up date in the 
manufacturing and service industries. We see that manufacturing establishments have witnessed a 
fall in the incidence of voice, especially for those set up after 1980 (i.e., after post-Thatcher labor 
market reforms). Service sector establishments did not seem to differ by set-up date although 
there was an increase of 10 percentage points in voice adoption from 1984 to 1998. 
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 In terms of voice regime, the changes have been more dramatic over time within the 
voice sector. In figure 4 we see that non-union only forms of voice have witnessed a remarkable 
increase since 1984 (increasing from 15 percent of all workplaces in 1984 to nearly 45 percent by 
1998), and this has occurred almost exclusively at the expense of union-only forms of voice. In 
fact, a decline is also apparent in dual forms of voice (union and non-union forms sitting side-by-
side).  
 
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics (1998 only) on the use of high-commitment HRM 
practices, overall and disaggregated by key right-hand side variables. On average across 
establishments, 6.9 practices out of 13 are used, although this figure differs considerably across 
the variables highlighted in our six hypotheses. In particular small, single-establishment, family 
owned, private sector and middle-aged establishments use fewer HCHRM practices than larger, 
non-family owned, public sector, and younger or older establishments.  
 
Table 2 also reports statistics for the “cross-effect” or the relation between voice (and 
voice type) and HRM intensity. It confirms that establishments with voice use more HCHRM 
practices. This is true across all forms of voice. However, within voice types, HCHRM intensity 
varies significantly. Union only voice clearly has the lowest HRM score amongst voice types, yet 
this should not be construed as evidence that union presence inside an establishment is 
necessarily detrimental to the adoption of HCHRM, as dual-forms of voice have a greater HRM 
score than non-union only. Another way into this question is to ask which HRM practices are 
more or less associated with certain voice types.  
Tables 3 and 4 address that question. In Table 3 we list all 13 HRM practices and split the 
percentage breakdowns by whether a workplace has voice or not. We see that most practices are 
more likely to be found in a workplace that also has formal voice. In Table 4 we present the same 
set of 13 practices, but looking at patterns within the voice-using sector. We see that 
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establishments with dual voice have a greater likelihood of adopting almost all HRM practices, 
except for the compensation related (extrinsic) components such as incentive pay and employee 
ownership schemes, where establishments with non-union only voice are more likely to use these 
two practices.  
           The empirical distribution of HRM practices by voice and voice type are graphically depicted in 
figures 5 and 6. In figure 5 we see the rightward shift in HRM intensity that occurs for 
workplaces with voice as compared to those without. In figure 6, across panels A through C we see 
the effect of voice-type on the empirical frequency of HRM practices. The panels are ranked in 
terms of overall mean in the HRM score, and we see how union-only voice with the lowest score 
also displays what unions seem to do everywhere, i.e., they compress the distribution of HRM 
scores. There are fewer outliers within the union voice type, with most firms located between 5 
and 8 practices. In each panel the dotted line represents the overall frequency of scores. 
 
Below we test if these relationships, which appear to confirm many of the conjectures in 
section 2, remain significant in our regression analysis. 
5.1 The Determinants of Voice Adoption  
We begin our analysis with a look at Table 5a. In this table we model the determinants of voice at 
the workplace using a linear probability model (logit estimates are similar and are available upon 
request). The coefficients can be interpreted as the percentage point change in voice adoption 
based on falling into one of our dependent categorical variable classifications. This table is 
limited in the number of RHS variables it can use since it pools all the data from 1984 to 1998 
into one regression. The earlier survey waves included fewer questions and hence covariates. That 
being said, our results appear consistent with several of our hypotheses. In particular we find that: 
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 Public (government) sector establishments are significantly more likely to adopt voice 
than private sector establishments (all things equal), consistent with the effect of 
ownership type on risk taking behavior, 
 Establishment size, as measured by number of employees, is positively related to voice 
adoption, consistent with the heterogeneity approach and benefits of voice rising with 
establishment size, and 
 Being part of a multi-establishment firm network or an employer association, as opposed 
to being a single-establishment non-member, increases the likelihood of adopting voice 
by 16 and 9 percentage points respectively, a confirmation of our epidemic/cascade 
model predictions. 
Many of these findings are replicated across union and dual voice types, but workplaces with 
non-union only voice seem to differ from some of these generalizations:  
• Non-union voice only workplaces are on average smaller and less likely to be public-
sector workplaces. 
• Whereas for all forms of voice set-up date proves insignificant, it does so because there 
are offsetting effects between union/dual voice and non-union only forms. An 
establishment set up after 1980 is 10 percentage points more likely to adopt non-union 
voice, whereas an otherwise similar workplace is 9 and 3 percentage points less likely to 
have dual or union only form of voice respectively. This confirms our switching cost 
prediction; i.e., union voice has greatest potential lock-in, newly established workplaces 
would be expected to avoid adopting it once regulatory constraints (the end of the closed 
shop) are lifted.   
As a test of network effects, we ran the same model as above, replacing individual industry 
dummies with a measure of voice incidence in the industry that the workplace was part of in the 
previous period. For example, we ran the same model as in Table 5a using 1998 data only, but 
entering the 1990 incidence of industry voice for each establishment. The results in Table 5b are 
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insignificant for voice overall, but strong network effects were found in the case of dual voice. 
That is, the greater the spread of dual voice in an industry in 1990, the greater the likelihood of a 
workplace in that industry adopting it in  1998. Insignificant negative effects were found for 
union-only and non-union only voice.  
 
Table 5c reports estimates of [1] with 1998 data only.  In the first column we use overall 
voice as our dependent variable and find that as anticipated, even after controlling for size of 
establishment and a host of other controls, family ownership exerts a strong negative effect on 
voice as compared to all other forms of ownership. This is consistent with the heterogeneity 
approach to diffusion and the potentially larger returns from not investing in voice that accrue to a 
single owner, inducing less adoption. All other variables carry the expected sign, including the 
indeterminate effects that come from workplace age, as the legitimization and competition effects 
appear to counteract each other and lead to insignificant age-related effects for voice adoption. 
5.2 The Determinants of HRM Intensity 
Table 6 reports estimates of models for HCHRM adoption and intensity. In the first column are 
the results of a dummy variable, which uses a cut-off of 9 HRM practices to denote a high 
HCHRM score (other cut-offs were tried and results were not significant different; results 
available upon request). We then explore the robustness of these results to a change in dependent 
variable, where the HRM intensity score is used. This score takes on a maximum value of 13 and 
a minimum of 0. In column (2) the mean score was 6.89 and as our results are qualitatively the 
same in both columns, we will confine our interpretation of results to the more intuitive HRM 
score results. When we look at our variables of interest we find that: 
• Workplace size once again has a positive and significant effect on the number of HRM 
practices adopted. 
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• Workplaces that are part of some multi-establishment network also adopt more HCHRM 
practices, with the number of those practices increasing with network size; 
•
 
Age of establishment displays the inverted-U shape hypothesized as a result of the 
offsetting effects of the legitimization and competition effects. Workplaces aged 3 to 4 
years are the most intensive users of HCHRM, while those aged under 3 and more than 
21 years have lower scores;  
•
 
Organizational affiliations generally increase the use HCHRM up to a point, as the 
highest category (4 affiliations) seems to make little difference. Workplaces with three 
organizational affiliations have the highest use of HCHRM, consistent with our epidemic 
learning models;  
• Finally, in terms of the hypothesized cross-effect between voice and HCHRM 
technologies, we find a more differentiated picture than previously explored. Consistent 
with much of literature, union only voice and HCHRM appear as substitutes, although the 
effect is small in magnitude. However, compared to workplaces with no voice, those with 
dual voice actually display the most intensive use of HCHRM, followed by non-union 
only.  
5.3 Implications 
So what do these results tell us about the uneven adoption of voice and HCHRM across 
workplaces? Firstly, our results suggest that voice and HCHRM are supermodular, at least in the 
sense that the two most common forms of voice, dual and non-union only, are linked positively 
with HCHRM practices. Union-only voice appears to be negatively related to HCHRM practices. 
This is an important finding as it suggests that union presence per se does not diminish HCHRM 
adoption, as dual channel voice (where both management and union forms of collective 
representation) was linked with the largest incidence of HCHRM adoption. We also find that 
scale and epidemic effects, reflected in variables capturing workplace size and size of multi-
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establishment network, explain a large part of the differences in adoption of voice and HCHRM 
across workplaces. This seems to confirm the idea that substantial non-pecuniary (learning 
effects) and non-obligatory costs  (i.e., the hiring of HRM specialists) play a substantial role in 
preventing ubiquitous adoption. 
 Adoption costs, especially switching costs, seem to play a role in that the likelihood of 
union-only voice is strongly linked to set-up date. Workplaces set up after 1980 were significantly 
less likely to adopt any form of union voice (union only or dual). Because it is harder to abandon 
union voice -- as it involves getting rid of a third party i.e., the  union --  than it is to abandon a 
management-led form of voice, this induces delay and encourages the adoption of easier-to-
abandon technologies.  
 Information about HCHRM and voice, as well as the diffusion of best practices, also 
seem to play a role in adoption, as reflected in our age and organizational affiliation variables. We 
should note, however, that for both voice and HCHRM, the age of establishment variable 
exhibited the counteracting effects of the population ecology’s legitimization and competition 
effects. The newer the HCHRM practice, the more workplaces that are initially needed to adopt in 
order to induce latecomers to also adopt. However, once many adopt, the advantage is lost and 
fewer firms then join in the wave, creating an optimal age at which adoption is most likely to 
occur (i.e., in our case 3 to 4 years of age). 
 We found strong evidence that family owned firms have a different perceived benefit 
function than non-family owned firms. Family owned firms, even after controlling for size, multi-
establishment, and industry were significantly less likely to adopt voice and use HCHRM 
practices. This result is consistent with the idea that every organization would in theory be better 
off not investing in voice and HCHRM, if it thought it could nevertheless reap all the benefits of 
these technologies (i.e., better effort, greater motivation, lower turnover etc.) without formal 
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adoption. This is a risky decision, however, and workplaces in the public sector or management 
run are less likely to make. 7 
 
6. Conclusion. 
In this paper we treated voice and HCHRM as technological innovations and explained why this 
approach could help account for the uneven adoption patterns observed across British 
establishments. Specifically, we used Workplace Employment Relations Survey (WERS) data 
from 1984 to 1998 to answer a series of longstanding questions. We asked whether the presence 
of voice was a significant predictor of HCHRM intensity. The positive effect we found suggests 
that the two technologies are “supermodular” (Milgrom and Roberts, 1995). As a corollary we 
also wanted to know which voice-type (i.e., union, dual or non-union) was most strongly linked to 
HCHRM intensity. These were important questions as it is often argued that HCHRM and union 
voice appear to be substitutes at the workplace. We found that the answer to this question is more 
nuanced than previously thought. While union-only voice does seem to be negatively related to 
HCHRM intensity, the presence of a union does not necessarily diminish HCHRM adoption. In 
fact, we found that workplaces with dual forms of voice (union and non-union side-by-side) had 
the highest HCHRM scores.  
We also asked which workplace characteristics were likely to increase the net benefit 
(and hence adoption) of voice and HCHRM. The variables were drawn from our appropriation of 
technology diffusion models to the question of voice and HCHRM adoption. We found 
significant effects for size of establishment, age, organisational affiliations, size of multi-
establishment networks and some evidence of network effects for dual voice. Finally, we 
provided an explanation for why it is that sector (government versus private) and ownership 
                                                 
7 These results may be explained by behavioral models which posit that when agents are faced with 
appropriating all the returns to some project, they gamble by not investing in voice or HCHRM. This latter 
result may also be a factor explaining the strong public sector effect present in our voice estimations. 
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(family owned/operated versus management run) remain such significant predictors of voice and 
HCHRM adoption across workplaces, even after controlling for standard explanations such as 
workplace size and industry.  The reason seems linked to a difference in perceived benefits, which can 
be explained by models of non-expected utility. 
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Table 1: Incidence of Voice by Selected Workplace Characteristics, 1984-1998 
 
 Percentages 
 Pooled data 
(1984, 1990 
and 1998) 
 
1984 
 
1998 
1. All Workplaces  82.6 83.6 83.1 
2. By Sector    
Public 98.2 99.7 98.9 
Private services 76.5 72.3 80.8 
Private manufacturing 72.8 78.2 65.2 
3. By Establishment size (employees)    
25-49 77.8 78.4 79.5 
50-99 80.4 86.1 82.7 
100-199 90.4 91.2 89.9 
200-499 94.5 94.1 93.5 
500-999 96.2 97.3 95.1 
1000 plus 98.2 99.9 96.5 
4. By Ownership    
Foreign 74.6 79.8 72.5 
Domestic 83.1 83.8 84.2 
5. By Establishment    
Single 64.1 59.5 70.7 
Multi-establishment 88.0 89.0 87.7 
6. By Size of Multi-Establishment Network*    
Single 71.8 -- 71.8 
2-10 83.9 -- 83.9 
11-50 83.3 -- 83.3 
50+ 92.5 -- 92.5 
7. By Set-up date    
Pre 1980 84.5 83.7 88.5 
Post 1980 78.6 82.8 78.5 
8. By Decade of Set-up date    
Pre 1980 84.5 -- -- 
1980s 77.7 -- -- 
1990s 78.7 -- -- 
9. By Establishment Age*    
<3 years 80.0 -- 80.0 
3-19 years 82.1 -- 82.1 
20+ years 86.1 -- 86.1 
10. By Industry     
Manufacturing 75.2 80.8 68.5 
Electricity, gas and water 99.4 99.0 99.9 
Construction 64.5 66.4 70.5 
Wholesale and retail  78.7 74.2 83.3 
Transport + Communication 86.9 93.8 86.0 
Financial services 75.8 71.4 76.8 
Other business services 93.3 94.9 93.6 
Public administration 98.4 94.9 99.9 
Education 96.7 98.7 98.7 
Health 99.2 99.9 99.9 
Other community services 99.3 99.9 98.1 
11. By HRM Score*    
High [9-13] 93.6 -- 93.6 
Low [0-8] 80.0 -- 80.0 
12. By Ownership Structure*    
Family owned/controlled 66.5 -- 66.5 
Other 88.8 -- 88.8 
13. By Employer Association Status    
Yes 85.1 88.4 87.9 
No 80.1 82.5 82.9 
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14. By Number of Organizational Affiliations*    
None 82.9 -- 82.9 
One 82.1 -- 82.1 
Two 85.3 -- 85.3 
Three 87.9 -- 87.9 
Four 99.4 -- 99.4 
15. By Franchise Status*    
Franchisee 91.7 -- 91.7 
Non-franchisee 83.1 -- 83.1 
 
Number of Observations 
 
5742 
 
1885 
 
1954 
 
Source: Data are for Britain using WERS/WIRS data, 1984, 1990, 1998. *Available for WERS 1998 only.  
Workplaces with 25+ employees 
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Table 2: Average High Commitment HRM Score (score 1 to 13) actual and Z-scores by selected 
workplace characteristics, 1998. 
 
 Average HRM 
Score 
Normalised 
Z-Score 
1. All Workplaces  6.9 0.09* 
2. By Sector   
Public 7.45 6.22 
Private 6.71 -2.00 
3. By Establishment size (employees)   
10-24 6.6 -3.22 
25-49 6.94 0.56 
50-99 7.19 3.33 
100-199 7.59 7.78 
200-499 7.93 11.56 
500+ 8.05 12.89 
4. By Ownership   
Foreign 7.15 2.89 
Domestic 6.89 0.00 
Joint Venture  5.81 -12.00 
5. By Establishment   
Single 5.81 -12.00 
Multi-establishment 7.39 5.56 
6. By Size of Multi-Establishment Network   
Single 5.83 -11.78 
2-10 7.03 1.56 
11-50 6.87 -0.22 
51+ 7.98 12.11 
7. By Organization Size   
Small [<50] 6.60 -3.22 
Large [51+] 7.92 11.44 
8. By Establishment Age   
<3 years 6.44 -5.00 
3-19 years 7.20 3.44 
20+ years 6.64 -2.78 
9. By Industry    
Manufacturing 6.01 -9.78 
Electricity, gas and water 9.19 25.56 
Construction 5.11 -19.78 
Wholesale and retail 7.31 4.67 
Hotels and restaurants 6.56 -3.67 
Transport + Communication 7.10 2.33 
Financial services 8.65 19.56 
Other business services 7.14 2.78 
Public administration 7.17 3.11 
Education 7.42 5.89 
Health 7.15 2.89 
Other community services 5.56 -14.78 
10. By Ownership   
Family owned/controlled 5.93 -10.67 
Other 7.22 3.67 
11. By Employer Association Status   
Yes 6.80 -1.00 
No 6.88 -0.11 
12. By Number of Organisational Affiliations   
0 6.88 -0.11 
1 6.67 -2.44 
2 6.96 0.78 
3 7.08 2.11 
4 7.87 10.89 
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13. By Franchise Status   
Franchise 6.77 -1.33 
Non-franchise 6.90 0.11 
14. By Type of Voice I   
No Voice 5.71 -13.11 
Union 6.41 -5.33 
Non-Union Only 6.86 -0.33 
Dual Channel 7.51 6.89 
15. By Type of Voice II    
No Voice 5.71 -13.11 
Representative Only 6.28 -6.78 
Representative and Direct 7.63 8.22 
Direct Only 6.75 -1.56 
 
Number of Observations 1929  
 
Source: Data are for Britain using WERS data 1998.  *The figure 0.09 is the standard deviation for the 
sample. 
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Table 3: Incidence of High Commitment HRM practices by workplaces with and without formal 
voice* (%), 1998. 
 
 
By Presence of Voice at workplace 
 
 
 
High Commitment HRM Practices  
No 
 
Yes 
 
All Workplaces 
 
1. Presence of Formal Strategic Plan 
 
 
47.1 
 
78.9 
 
73.7 
2. Guaranteed Job Security 
 
7.2 10.9 10.3 
3. Selective Recruitment  
 
46.4 54.8 53.4 
4. Employee Ownership Scheme 
 
11.2 15.4 14.7 
5. Presence of Incentive Pay 
 
53.3 52.7 52.8 
6. Ongoing Training 
 
57.5 73.2 70.6 
7. Internal “Symbolic” Equity 
 
20.0 46.6 42.2 
8. Internal Promotion 
 
24.2 25.8 25.6 
9. Formal Appraisal System  
 
37.4 56.7 53.5 
10. Information Sharing 
 
57.5 73.2 79.9 
11. Self-Managed Teams 
 
62.6 77.5 75.0 
12. Job Enrichment 
 
61.2 70.1 68.6 
13. Participation and Empowerment 
 
69.9 59.5 61.1 
Number of Observations 346 
(0.17) 
1742 
(0.83) 
2088 
(1.00) 
 
Notes: Source: Data are for Britain using WERS data 1998. Numbers in parentheses refer to sample 
proportions. *Broad definition of “voice” is used.  
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Table 4: Incidence of High Commitment HRM practices by type of workplace voice* 
(%), 1998. 
 
 
Type of Formal voice 
 
 
 
 
 
Communication Practice 
Non-Union Only Dual Channel Union 
Only 
 
1. Presence of Formal Strategic Plan 
 
 
74.4 
 
87.7 
 
72.7 
2. Guaranteed Job Security 
 
6.9 18.4 4.0 
3. Selective Recruitment  
 
48.5 67.2 41.1 
4. Employee Ownership Scheme 
 
16.8 14.4 8.3 
5. Presence of Incentive Pay 
 
61.3 41.2 39.4 
6. Ongoing Training 
 
72.1 75.0 67.7 
7. Internal “Symbolic” Equity 
 
41.9 53.7 49.7 
8. Internal Promotion 
 
26.5 26.5 16.1 
9. Formal Appraisal System  
 
59.9 53.8 42.5 
10. Information Sharing 
 
79.9 88.0 88.9 
11. Self-Managed Teams 
 
71.8 85.6 82.1 
12. Job Enrichment 
 
66.2 76.4 68.9 
13. Participation and Empowerment 
 
59.3 59.8 60.2 
Number of Observations 1005 
(0.58) 
634 
(0.37) 
103 
(0.06) 
 
Notes: Source: Data are for Britain using WERS data 1998. Numbers in parentheses refer to sample 
proportions *Broad definition of “voice” is used. 
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Table 5a: The Determinants of Voice at the Workplace, Pooled 1984-1998.  
Linear Probability Estimates  
(1) (2) (3) 
 
(4) 
Omitted reference category [No Voice] Dependent Variable   
 Voice Non-
Union  
Dual 
Channel 
Union  
Only 
Dependent Variable Mean 0.82 0.29 0.37 0.15 
1. Public Sector  [Private] 0.12 
(4.77) 
-0.32 
(-10.17) 
0.26 
(7.06) 
0.18 
(6.18) 
2. Foreign Owned [Domestic] -0.07 
(-1.70) 
0.02 
(0.46) 
-0.06 
(-1.76) 
-0.03 
(-1.52) 
3. Workplace Size [25-49 employees]     
50-99  0.07 
(3.19) 
0.03 
(1.35) 
0.02 
(0.77) 
0.02 
(1.30) 
100-199 0.11 
(5.79) 
-0.01 
(-0.55) 
0.08 
(3.53) 
0.05 
(2.43) 
200-499 0.15 
(7.36) 
-0.05 
(-2.05) 
0.14 
(5.88) 
0.05 
(2.19) 
500+ 0.16 
(7.12) 
-0.09 
(-4.10) 
0.21 
(5.99) 
0.04 
(1.20) 
4. Part of Establishment Network [Single]  0.16 
(5.37) 
0.03 
(1.15) 
0.18 
(8.90) 
0.01 
(0.47) 
5. Member of Employer Association [No] 0.09 
(3.24) 
0.12 
(4.94) 
0.12 
(4.27) 
-0.09 
(-4.01) 
6. By Set-up Date Post 1980 [Pre 1980] -0.02 
(-0.72) 
0.10 
(3.95) 
-0.09 
(-3.94) 
-0.03 
(-1.80) 
7. Year Dummy [1998]     
1984 -0.03 
(-1.41) 
-0.14 
(-5.68) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.11 
(5.20) 
1990 -0.02 
(-0.63) 
-0.10 
(-3.39) 
0.04 
(1.81) 
0.04 
(2.32) 
8. Industry SIC 1980 [Other services]     
Electricity, gas and water  0.04 
(1.62) 
-0.16 
(-4.02) 
0.05 
(0.53) 
0.16 
(1.89) 
Mining, Fishing and Extraction -0.10 
(-1.70) 
-0.16 
(-2.79) 
-0.09 
(-1.81) 
0.16 
(3.44) 
Metal Industry Manufacturing  -0.15 
(-2.74) 
-0.12 
(-2.33) 
-0.12 
(-3.27) 
0.10 
(3.36) 
Other Manufacturing -0.09 
(-2.36) 
-0.14 
(-3.22) 
-0.09 
(-2.18) 
0.13 
(4.51) 
Construction -0.22 
(-4.07) 
-0.17 
(-3.43) 
-0.17 
(-3.88) 
0.12 
(2.66) 
Hotels, Restaurants and Distribution  -0.06 
(-1.75) 
0.08 
(2.02) 
-0.17 
-4.79) 
0.03 
(1.34) 
Transport and Communication -0.03 
(-0.81) 
-0.16 
(-4.53) 
-0.00 
-0.22) 
0.15 
(4.11) 
Financial Services -0.08 
(-2.20) 
-0.05 
(-1.28) 
-0.07 
(-1.55) 
0.04 
(1.18) 
9. Intercept 0.93 
(22.77) 
0.36 
(7.94) 
0.49 
(11.21) 
0.08 
(2.52) 
Observations 4997 4997 4997 4997 
R-squared 0.21 0.20 0.22 0.22 
Notes: Linear probability estimates. Items in [ ] refer to omitted reference category. T-stats in parentheses. 
Workplaces include those 25+ employees. *Narrow definition of voice employed.  
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Table 5b: The effect of the extent of industry voice adoption in 1990 on individual workplace 
Voice* adoption in 1998. 
 
  
 
Forms of Voice  
Coefficient 
 
t-value 
   
1. For All Voice 0.175 0.52 
2. For Dual 0.969 3.64 
3. For Non-Union only -0.528 -1.46 
4. For Union-Only -0.175 -0.52 
   
 
Note: Each row shows coefficients for the network effect variable, based on separate linear probability estimates with 
same controls as Table 5a except for industry dummies. Workplaces include those 25+ employees. *Narrow definition 
of voice employed.  
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Table 5c: The Determinants of Voice at the Workplace, 1998. 
Linear Probability Estimates  
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
 
(4) 
Omitted reference category [No Voice] Dependent Variable   
 Voice Non-
Union  
Dual 
Channel 
Union  
Only 
Dependent Variable Mean 0.84 0.48 0.30 0.05 
1. Public Sector [Private] 0.10 
(2.18) 
-0.42 
(-6.43) 
0.57 
(8.97) 
-0.05 
(-1.04) 
2. Foreign Owned [Domestic] -0.07 
(-1.11) 
0.04 
(0.72) 
-0.07 
(-1.93) 
-0.04 
(-2.50) 
Joint-venture 0.21 
(3.11) 
0.32 
(2.00) 
-0.05 
(-0.37) 
-0.06 
(-1.72) 
3. Family Owned or controlled [Other] -0.12 
(-2.08) 
0.02 
(0.27) 
-0.11 
(-2.49) 
-0.03 
(-1.30) 
4. Franchise [Non-Franchise] 0.16 
(2.28) 
0.23 
(3.17) 
-0.05 
(-1.44) 
-0.02 
(-1.08) 
5. Workplace Size [10-24 employees]     
25-49 
 
0.07 
(1.52) 
0.09 
(1.91) 
0.00 
(0.20) 
-0.02 
(-0.88) 
50-99 0.07 
(1.78) 
0.07 
(1.48) 
0.02 
(0.59) 
-0.03 
(-0.96) 
100-199 0.13 
(3.43) 
-0.02 
(-0.34) 
0.15 
(3.25) 
-0.00 
(-0.05) 
200-499 0.10 
(2.55) 
-0.11 
(-2.27) 
0.26 
(5.19) 
-0.05 
(-1.51) 
500+ 0.10 
(2.15) 
-0.17 
(-3.15) 
0.31 
(5.80) 
-0.04 
(-1.25) 
6. Size of Establishment Network [Single]      
2-10 0.04 
(0.76) 
-0.14 
(-2.27) 
0.15 
(3.48) 
 0.03 
(0.99) 
11-50 0.03 
(0.63) 
-0.13 
(-2.09) 
0.18 
(4.35) 
-0.02 
(0.47) 
51+ 0.05 
(1.14) 
-0.07 
(-1.11) 
0.14 
(2.72) 
-0.02 
(0.59) 
7. Number of Organisational Affiliations [None]     
One 0.03 
(0.71) 
0.04 
(0.80) 
-0.01 
(-0.35) 
0.01 
(0.26) 
Two 0.12 
(2.24) 
0.12 
(2.06) 
-0.01 
(-0.17) 
0.00 
(0.23) 
Three 0.10 
(1.06) 
-0.02 
(-0.22) 
0.10 
(1.25) 
0.01 
(0.29) 
Four 0.24 
(3.98) 
0.20 
(1.68) 
0.07 
(0.76) 
-0.03 
(-1.12) 
8. Age of Establishment [21+ yrs]     
10-20 -0.05 
(1.00) 
0.03 
(0.47) 
-0.05 
(-1.43) 
-0.02 
(1.26) 
5-9 -0.05 
(-0.81) 
-0.04 
(-0.61) 
-0.02 
(-0.49) 
0.01 
(0.35) 
3-4 0.01 
(0.26) 
0.09 
(0.96) 
-0.07 
(-1.93) 
-0.01 
(-0.44) 
<3 
 
-0.07 
(-0.94) 
-0.02 
(-0.34) 
-0.03 
(-0.52) 
-0.02 
(-0.37) 
9. HRM Score [13pts] 0.03 
(2.41) 
0.03 
(2.16) 
0.01 
(0.76) 
-0.02 
(-1.81) 
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10. Industry [Wholesale and Retail]     
Manufacturing -0.07 
(-0.81) 
-0.29 
(-3.52) 
0.16 
(2.87) 
0.07 
(1.58) 
Electricity, gas and water 0.08 
(1.44) 
-0.61 
(-8.89) 
0.70 
(11.94) 
-0.01 
(-0.29) 
Construction -0.12 
(-1.11) 
-0.25 
(-2.13) 
0.05 
(0.69) 
0.08 
(1.24) 
Hotels and restaurants -0.01 
(-0.12) 
0.09 
(1.11) 
-0.08 
(-1.79) 
-0.02 
(-1.58) 
Transport and communication -0.07 
(-0.72) 
-0.24 
(-2.28) 
0.12 
(1.59) 
0.05 
(1.20) 
Financial services -0.06 
(1.08) 
-0.34 
(-3.16) 
0.38 
(4.05) 
0.02 
(0.82) 
Other business services 0.07 
(1.08) 
0.12 
(1.57) 
-0.04 
(-0.90) 
-0.01 
(-0.65) 
Public administration 
 
0.08 
(1.03) 
-0.09 
(-0.68) 
0.03 
(0.19) 
0.14 
(1.52) 
Education 
 
0.03 
(0.40) 
-0.03 
(-0.28) 
-0.05 
(-0.75) 
0.11 
(1.41) 
Health 
 
0.02 
(0.29) 
-0.12 
(-1.37) 
0.11 
(1.98) 
0.04 
(1.32) 
Other community services 0.02 
(0.18) 
0.01 
(0.10) 
0.03 
(0.42) 
-0.02 
(-0.85) 
11. Intercept 0.66 
(6.13) 
 0.23 
(2.89) 
0.10 
(2.28) 
Observations 1583  1583 1583 
R-squared 0.17  0.45 0.09 
 
Note: Items in [  ] refer to omitted reference category.  
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Table 6: The Determinants of High Commitment HRM Intensity at the Workplace, 1998.  
 
 Dependent variable:  
High HRM Score Dummy  
[Probit Estimates] 
Dependent variable:  
HRM Score 
[OLS] 
Dep. Var. Mean 0.43 6.89 
 Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat 
1. Public Sector [Private] -0.17 -0.78 -0.02 -0.05 
2. Foreign Owned [Domestic]  0.32  1.60  0.09  0.27 
Joint-Venture -0.36 -3.45 -1.91 -3.48 
3. Family Owned or controlled [Other] -0.60 -3.22 -0.56 -2.34 
4. Franchise [Non-Franchise] -0.04 -0.12 -0.21 -0.43 
5. Workplace Size [10-24 employees]     
25-49 0.06 0.39  0.08 0.44 
50-99 0.15 1.00  0.36 1.76 
100-199 0.42 2.82  0.81 3.77 
200-499 0.57 3.70  0.94 4.17 
500+ 0.60 3.29  1.13 4.28 
6. Size of  Establishment Network [Single]     
2-10  0.46  2.50 1.46 5.39 
11-50 -0.03 -0.98 0.40 1.47 
51+  0.57  3.38 0.88 3.90 
7. Age of Establishment [21+ yrs]     
10-20 0.24 1.49 0.51 2.31 
5-9 0.22 1.20 0.53 2.30 
3-4 0.51 2.13 0.94 2.96 
<3 0.22 0.93 0.22 0.70 
8. Number of Organizational Affiliations [None]     
One  0.02  0.13 0.03 0.21 
Two  0.23  1.29 0.42 1.68 
Three  0.52  1.94 0.75 1.88 
Four  -0.15 -0.46 0.98 1.71 
9. Type of Voice [No Voice]     
Union only -0.44 -1.25 -0.14 -0.39 
Non-Union only  0.52  1.97 0.59 1.93 
Dual Channel  0.58  2.41 0.67 2.56 
10.570. Industry [Wholesale and retail]     
Manufacturing -0.65 -2.72 -0.94 -2.75 
Electricity, gas and water  0.72 2.16 1.11 2.38 
Construction -0.88 -3.08 -1.52 -3.52 
Hotels and restaurants -0.36 -1.20 -1.07 -2.66 
Transport and communication -0.11 -0.32 -0.37 -1.05 
Financial services -0.05 -0.19 0.59 1.65 
Other business services -0.01 -0.04 -0.05 -0.13 
Public administration -0.01 -0.01 -0.54 -0.97 
Education -0.00 -0.01 0.15 0.44 
Health  0.33 1.23 0.29 0.80 
Other community services -0.32 -1.13 -1.49 -2.99 
11. Intercept -1.00 -3.54 6.97 18.68 
Observations 1583  1583  
F-stat/R-squared 5.62  0.32  
Notes: Probability estimates refer to marginal probabilities. Items in [  ] refer to omitted reference category.  
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: Incidence of all non-voice related communication practices by workplaces with and 
without formal voice* (%), 1998. 
 
 
Formal voice present at workplace? 
 
 
 
 
Communication Practice 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
1. Management chain 
 
35 
 
56 
2. Suggestion schemes (narrow def. Re. Management consulting staff)  
8 
 
28 
3. Suggestion schemes (broader def. Including channels for suggesting 
improvements to work methods) 
 
 
12 
 
 
37 
4. Newsletter 16 47 
5. European Works Council 2 6 
6. Any JCC (including those meeting less than once a month)  
2 
 
23 
7. Consultative committee above workplace level  7 (19)** 40 (63)** 
8. All two-way team briefings 43 89 
9. Two-way team briefings for an identifiable group of workers  
8 
 
54 
10. Other methods for consultation not elsewhere specified  
16 
 
14 
 
Notes: *Broad definition of “voice” is used.**Figures in parentheses use base=workplaces belonging to 
larger organisation.  
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Figure 1: Frequency of HRM Scores For British Workplaces (10+employees), 1998 
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Figure 2:Use of Voice in Britain by Establishment Set-Up Date, Private Workplaces 1984-98 
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Figure 3: The Use of Voice in Britain by Type, All Workplaces 1984-98 
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Figure 4: Use of Voice in Britain by Type and Set Up date, Private Manufacturing 1984-98 
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Figure 5: Frequency of HRM Scores by Voice For British Workplaces (10+employees), 1998 
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Figure 6: Frequency of HRM Scores by Type For British Workplaces (10+), 1998 
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Panel B: Workplaces With Non-Union Voice Only [6.8] 
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Panel C: Workplaces With Dual-Channel (Union + Non-Union) Voice [7.5] 
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